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For many years, Michael Moehler has been one of the most original and thoughtful
political and moral philosophers around. He is perhaps the most straight-forward
and full-throated defender of what Gerald Gaus (2011) has called “orthodox
instrumentalism.” From this, Moehler develops two interesting results: a Kantian
flavored theory of justice and a novel, multi-level contractarian theory of social
morality. In these short comments, I will discuss what I take to be the core of
Moehler’s theory and then raise some questions and challenges to that theory.

1. The Project
The motivating force of Moehler’s project is the specter of “moral pluralism.” This
leads him to declare, on the first page, that “in modern pluralistic societies,
especially under the assumption of deep moral pluralism, the ideal of a fully just
society as judged from the perspectives of all members of society is unattainable”
(2018, 1). This sentence illuminates Moehler’s entire project. In it, Moehler
mentions “deep moral pluralism,” the “idea of a fully just society,” and the
“perspectives of all members of society.” He notes that current attempts to find a
justification for an ideal of a fully just society do not and cannot assume deep moral
pluralism of the sort that he will confront. This makes it impossible for them to
provide justification from the perspective of all members of society. In effect,
Moehler is claiming that the constructivist, contractual project justifying social
morality—as it currently stands—is a failure.
The diagnosis of the problem of these theories is their inability to remain stable in
the face of deep pluralism. This is a theoretical flaw, but it may also be a practical
1

one depending on how closely any society approaches the level of pluralism that
concerns Moehler. We can think of the problem as a tension between two desiderata
of contractualist theories of justice. 1 These are what I call existence and stability. In
other work (Thrasher Forthcoming), I have argued that this problem—what I call,
the paradox of diversity—is a general one for contractualist theories. This paradox
results from a tension between the existence conditions of finding a possible
(perhaps unique) contractual agreement and the ability of that agreement to remain
stable in the face of diversity. What makes the problem paradoxical is that the tools
used to secure agreement by reducing diversity in the contractual model makes the
agreement unstable in the face of further diversity or deeper pluralism. Although
Moehler does not describe the problem in exactly this way, he sees the flaw of
existing contractualist theories as their inability to deal with this fundamental
tension.
Many see this tension as making contractualism about justice “self-defeating” in
some way (Wall 2002; Bajaj 2017; Wendt 2018). In response, the solution is to give
up on constructivism and contractualism about morality or justice and to embrace
some form of intuitionism (Enoch 2013), comprehensive theory (e.g.,
egalitarianism, libertarianism, or whatever), or perfectionism (Raz 1986; Wall
1998).2 This strategy (in its various forms) doesn’t deny the substantial moral
diversity in modern societies, but argues that this diversity is only an apparent one
or the result of some error in reasoning. There may be one or many different true
values or moral truths, but whatever these are, they should be the fundamental basis
of our social morality and system of justice. 3 There is no alternative, on this view
to deciding between different and conflicting comprehensive views.
Without rejecting contractualism, there are two basic strategies for dealing with the
paradox if diversity. One is to weaken the existence conditions, perhaps by giving
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I use “contractualist” throughout to refer to the constructivist, contractual theories of justice that

Moehler is concerned with including those of Rawls, Harsanyi, Southwood, and Gaus. Moehler uses
“contractarian.” Nothing hangs on this distinction for the purposes of my argument.
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I use “constructivism” here broadly to basically mean that the justification for morality or justice

is an internal one to the agreement procedure, i.e., no external standards are used to directly generate
the justification of the norms in question. For elaboration, see (Thrasher 2019).
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It is important to note that Moehler is careful to restrict his theory to morality rather than politics.

This division, however, is not particularly sharp either conceptually or practically. Justice, for
instance, may be the “first virtue of social institutions” and, hence, political, but it is also a more
general moral standard.
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up on uniqueness (Thrasher 2014), or by going further and giving up on any
determinant contractual agreement at all (e.g., Muldoon 2017). Another route it to
weaken the importance of stability by arguing, as Jon Quong (2011) does, that the
scope of the contractual agreement should only apply to “reasonable” people or,
even more narrowly, liberals. This is what Quong calls the “internal” justification
of liberalism.
Moehler rejects both of these strategies and instead argues that it is possible to solve
the existence problem with a unique contractualist theory of justice that is also
stable in the face of deep moral pluralism. His solution relies on several key
innovations, which I will describe briefly.
The core conceptual move is to distinguish between traditional and pure
instrumental morality. Traditional moral theories are justified on the basis of moral
premises. This means, however, that unless there is agreement on those moral
premises, there will not generally be agreement on the moral conclusions.
Traditional morality, as Moehler (2018, 7) points out, is logically conservative, “no
morals in, no morals out.” In societies characterized by deep pluralism, however, it
is guaranteed that there will be no agreement on basic moral premises and, hence,
no stable fundamentally moral agreement. The entirety of Part I of Minimal
Morality, is dedicated to showing the problems with traditional morality in its
contractualist guise. But, as Moehler argues, just because traditional moral theory
reaches its limits under conditions of deep moral pluralism, it doesn’t follow that
moral theory as such has reached its limit. We may find other rabbits in other hats.
The trick is to go back to Hobbes and resuscitate a purely instrumental justification
of a social morality. As Moehler shows (correctly to my mind) in Part I, the
presumed avatar of instrumentalist morality, David Gauthier, is nothing of the sort.
His contractualism relies on a move away from purely instrumental reasoning and,
explicitly in its current version (Gauthier 2013a; 2013b), introduces a thin but,
nevertheless moral, premises of “rational and reasonable cooperation” (Moehler
2018, 60). This leads him to adopt a revisionist theory of practical rationality and
to move away from orthodox instrumental rationality.
In response to this failure, Moehler introduces his notion of “pure instrumental
morality” in Part II. His aim is to avoid the revisionary instrumentalism of Gauthier.
This creates a bit of a problem, though. Moehler has already spent 92 pages
showing how Hobbesian theories (both orthodox and revisionist) go wrong, as well
as the flaws of traditional bargaining approaches. The danger is that in so doing, he
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may have also undermined his own case that an instrumental account of morality is
possible.
He solves this not by revising the theory of instrumentalist rationality, as Gauthier
does, but by introducing a new model of the rational chooser. As I have argued
elsewhere (2019), we can think of the general form of contractualist theories as
being:
General Model of Contractualism N chooses R in M and this gives N*
reason to endorse and comply with R in the real world insofar as the reasons
N has for choosing R in M can be shared by N*
The traditional “instrumentalist” contractualism models the contractual choosers
(N) as Homo Economicus. Moehler argues, instead, that these reasoners should be
modeled as, what he calls, Homo Prudens. These reasoners are forward looking
instrumentalists who value their lives and well-being above other values and, for
this reason, are primarily interested in securing the benefits of long-term social and
economic cooperation. Importantly, although security is their highest value, they
do not value it so much that they are unwilling to trade it off with welfare gains in
other areas (Moehler 2018, 101). These agents are also unable to “follow rules” in
the strong sense that they can make binding commitments (Moehler 2018, 103).
Moehler argues that instrumental rationality, in this sense, is the “default theory”
and can be assumed as the baseline of any rational agent.
This change in modeling of N, also requires a change in the model of agreement
(M) and move from traditional contractualist deliberative models (e.g., aggregation
or bargaining) to what Moehler (2018, 107) calls “empathetic contractor theory.”
The motivation is that, given deep pluralism, the contractual agents may not be able
to know or predict well the aims and behavior of their counterparts. The solution is
that agents in the contractual model can empathize with each other as
instrumentally rational agents even if they cannot empathize with each other as fullblooded persons. The main modeling assumptions are made in the context of twoperson, non-cooperative game theory.4 The agents are not veiled as they are in the
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For interesting reasons worth discussing in their own right, but that I will pass over here, Moehler

does not think that formal techniques are particularly helpful as models of morality. This is an
interesting claim for several reasons and could form the basis of an entire discussion of Moehler’s
approach, but there is so much interesting in the substance of Moehler’s proposals that I will leave
discussions of methodology for another time.
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Rawlsian theory; they know who they are and what they want. They are, however,
veiled by the uncertainty of their future conflicts. This is not a general “veil of
uncertainty” of the type that we find in the work of Geoffrey Brennan and James
Buchanan (1985), however, since the contractors are only uncertain about their
future conflicts. We will return to this difference later.
Given these assumptions, the contractors are then assumed to have two goals. The
first is to maximize their expected utility given peaceful cooperation. The second
is that agents will only agree to principles of conflict resolution that allow them to
meet a “minimal standard of living.” This second condition states that all
contractors are assumed to have a background of basic rights that serve as a baseline
to any agreement. So, given these two conditions, agents will seek the best possible
cooperative settlement within the constraint of their basic rights (whatever those
may be).5 The settlement or contract must also be one that all rational agents (in the
sense Moehler has specified) can agree to and that covers all cases of conflict (in
the sense that Moehler has specified). This is a tall order.
The principle that Moehler (2018, 124–25) argues that rational agents would agree
to is what he calls the weak principle of universalization as a “rational coordinative
device.” This is basically a Kantian principle of universalization that is constrained
by the minimal rights baseline and the assumptions that gains are relative to
bargaining power. This result is, according to Moehler, the unique solution to the
peace game. Part of the justification for this conclusion relies on Moehler’s
arguments in favor of the (stabilized) Nash bargaining solution more generally.
Something I will return to below. This solution to the problem of conflict also has
the advantage, according to Moehler, of indirectly embodying many moral
properties (autonomy, reciprocity, etc.) without assuming them at the outset. If he
has succeeded, then, Mohler has shown that, under the rights circumstances, a lowly
Hobbesian caterpillar can become a magnificent Kantian butterfly. An impressive
achievement.
There is much more to say about the details of Moehler’s project, but I will now
turn my attention to critically evaluating Moehler’s core story about how this
deliberative chrysalis is formed and question whether it will produce what Moehler
has argued it will.

5

See (Moehler 2018, 116–18) for a discussion of the complexities that will play into determining

the exact nature of the basic minimum here.
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2. Critical Evaluation
A. Traditional and Instrumental Morality
Moehler’s entire approach relies on a distinction between what he calls “traditional”
and “instrumental” morality. The idea, as I have described it above, is simple
enough. Traditional moralities are close to what Rawls would call “comprehensive
doctrines” or at least judgments about values and the good. Instrumental morality
is restricted to one narrow conception of practical rationality, but the more
important aspect of it is that it is meant to be a shared morality based on a shared
ability for instrumental rationality.
This distinction raises interesting questions about the relationship between these
two types of morality. In what sense are they both “moralities” at all. One of the
most innovative and pregnant aspects of the theory in Minimal Morality is what we
might call its account of the non-uniformity of the moral domain. He describes this
as the distinctive “multi-level” aspect of his theory, but perhaps “levels” in this
sense is misleading. What Moehler is really saying is that morality is not unified
into one set of principles and norms or that many underlying moral systems can be
unified through some set of hierarchical meta-principles or meta-norms. Instead,
the realm of instrumental morality where his contract theory has its purchase is a
fundamentally different thing than the “traditional” moralities where we normally
live. He is, in this sense, not giving us account of the true morality, but of a true
morality. One that can step in an solve a problem that other moral theories cannot.
This aspect of Moehler’s theory is one of the most important contributions of this
book and even those who are critical of other aspects of the work should take this
seriously.
Nevertheless, disunifying the moral domain has some theoretical risks. For
instance, Moehler (2018, 133–39) is keen to show that his weak principle of
universalization embodies important moral properties like equality, autonomy, and
reciprocity. This is a principle in the instrumental domain of morality. Moehler
means to show that this is not only an instrumental principle of peace and security
(something like Hobbes’s “laws of nature”), but a genuinely moral principles in its
own right. In other work, Gerald Gaus and I (2015, 41) have argued that the
contractual theories of Rawls and Gauthier both have what we call an identification
and recognition test as success conditions. The identification test shows that some
agreement on moral principles or rules is possible (and stable), while the
recognition test shows that these principles are rules are genuinely moral rules or
principles. Put slightly differently, passing the recognition test shows that the rules
or principles agree upon in the contract have the distinctive normativity of morality
rather than of, e.g., rationality or prudence. The identification test links the output
6

of the contract to rationality, while the recognition test links the output of the
contract to a recognizable moral point of view.6
Very often, objections of this sort to contractualism are merely exercises in moral
question begging, but the distinction between instrumental and traditional
moralities poses distinct problems. Although traditional and instrumental morality
are presented as hierarchically distinct, there is no doubt that the norms of one will
often conflict with the norms of the other. Cases of conflicting moral codes, for
instance, raise the specter of fundamental moral disagreement that may call into
question a shared normative category of morality (Doris and Plakias 2008). In any
case, delimiting the types of norms that count as distinctively moral as opposed to,
for instance, honor norms, is harder to do than many have assumed (Thrasher and
Handfield 2018; Thrasher 2018). This problem is amplified by the very different
properties of traditional and instrumental morality.
The concern is that the distinctiveness of instrumental morality may make its
principles difficult to recognize from the moral point of view. And, insofar as they
are, why shouldn’t we think that instrumental morality is a distinctive level of
morality rather than a different (and perhaps better) type of traditional morality.
The response is, I think, that traditional and instrumental morality do not conflict in
the traditional sense. Instead, they answer practical normative question in different,
but related domains. The scope of instrumental morality is sufficiently limited to a
particular normative domain—cases of conflict—and that this restriction of scope
should eliminate any possibility of conflict between the two types of morality.
Imagine the set of traditional moral norms or principles (T) and the set of
instrumental moral norms and principles (I) as both being subsets of the overall set
of norms or principles (S) in a society. For the two sets to not conflict it must be
true that 𝑇 ∩ 𝐼 = ∅ or that the norms of traditional and instrumental morality are
disjoint. This assumption is, in principle, plausible but it raises questions about the
possibility empathetic contracting.
The problem is about the relationship between the two sets of norms. For instance,
is it possible or even necessary to translate between the two sets of norms? Put
differently, are moral questions within T what Carnap (1950) called internal
questions? If so, each traditional morality will act like a Carnapian linguistic
framework, with meaningful internal questions and meaningless external questions.
6
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To ask questions about the relationship between two disjoint sets of norms,
however, internal questions will not be enough. There will need to be a way to
translate from one to the other.
To put a fine point on this, consider the question semantically with regards to basic
moral normative terms like “right” or “good.” These will have meaning within a
set of norms or principles, but will not generalize if the sets of norms or principles
are disjoint. We will have to move from the formal to the material mode of
discourse to make sense of how the norms relate to one another, which is to say we
will need to talk about the norms of traditional morality or instrumental morality,
while not talking within them. This is what Quine calls, in the more general context,
semantic ascent (2013, 250).
Moehler’s description of instrumental morality sounds like a form of instrumental
ascent. Within our traditional moralities we have internal questions that cannot be
answered between different moralities and to solve these problems, we ascend to a
shared, higher moral ground as homo prudens. If this is what is going on, however,
there are several potential problems for Moehler’s theory.
The first is that traditional and instrumental morality as Moehler conceives of them
are not sets of moral norms or principles that range over different scopes, as I
described above, instead they are two totally different domains. One is morality and
the other is something else. The types of norms, not their substance is different.
This undermines Moehler’s solution to the recognitional problem, though.
Instrumental morality is not a morality at all, it is some other set of norms or
principles that has some interesting indirect moral features, namely generating
peace.
The second problem is more serious. Why should we restrict instrumental ascent to
cases of conflict? To paraphrase Quine (2013, 254), homo prudens is not in “cosmic
exile” from the moral conceptual schemes of his or her traditional moral
counterparts.7 Which is just to say that this method of ascent is open to those in the
context of traditional morality as well. This point pushes against the attempt to
segregate or firewall off the arguments in favor of instrumental morality from the
realm of traditional morality. Moehler (2018, 141) argues that the weak principles
7
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schemes. One way to understand the radical diversity that Muldoon (2017) discusses, in terms of
“perspectives,” and that Gaus (2016) analyses is in terms of something like radical translation of the
Quinean variety.
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of universalization “does not interfere” with traditional morality. Why not? If A=
{𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , … 𝑎𝑛 } is a set of members of society that share some traditional morality
and 𝐵 = {𝑏1 , 𝑏2 , … 𝑏𝑛 } is a disjoint set of individuals in society who share some
other, distinct morality, if any 𝑎𝑛 can employ instrumental ascent with any 𝑏𝑛 , why
can’t 𝑎1and 𝑎2 do exactly the same thing, insofar as they disagree? That is, why
isn’t instrumental morality in the form of the weak principle of universalization a
universal moral theory available to all members of society at any time insofar as
they disagree?
The final point along these lines concerns how we are supposed to make sense of a
common baseline of rights and goods given that there is fundamental moral
disagreement in the background. This creates a dilemma for Moehler. Either the
minimal bargaining baseline is individuated according to the moral categories of
traditional morality, in which case the baselines won’t be shared and cannot do their
job, or they are made within the context of instrumental morality, in which case
they can only range over cases of conflict. The first horn is a fundamental problem
for the project, but the second is not very attractive either. Most of the basic rights
and goods that we are concerned with are not defined in cases of conflict. The
meaning of rights to self-ownership or autonomy, for instance, will not be easily
translated into instrumental morality. This means that either Moehler will need to
embrace the universal empire of instrumental morality or find some neutral and
unique way of partition the space of rights and goods without relying on traditional
or instrumental morality.
B. Modeling the Possibility of Agreement
Leaving aside the questions raised above, there are several important questions to
ask also about the deliberative or contractual model itself. First, why are cases of
conflict modeled as pure coordination problems (2018, 121)? Pure coordination
problems, like the one represented below in Table 1, have the interesting property
that both parties are indifferent to the solution to the coordination problem.

Cricket
Beach

Cricket
1,1
0,0

Beach
0,0
1,1

Table 1—Pure Coordination Game

This is in contrast to an impure coordination or “mixed-motive” coordination
problem where the parties are not indifferent between the alternative solutions. A
version of this type of problem is represented in Table 2 below.
Cricket

Beach
9

Cricket
Beach

1,3
0,0

0,0
3,1

Table 2—Mixed-Motive Coordination Problem

In this game, row would much rather have the coordination solution be going to the
beach rather than going to the cricket and column thinks the opposite. In this
situation, there is a kind of conflict between the two parties over whose better option
should win out.
If the agreement situation really is meant to be a case of pure coordination, the
problem is indeterminacy. Since either solution is acceptable and both parties are
indifferent, there is no particular reason to choose either. This undermines the claim
that there is a unique solution to the conflict case—any solution will do. This
undermines the uniqueness of the case for the weak principle of universalization,
however.
If, however, conflict is modeled as impure coordination, the problem is even more
serious. The solution will need to be asymmetrical, but this will privilege some over
others in the resolution of conflict. This raises the question, however, of why the
scope of the contractual agreement should be over all conflicts instead of just
particular conflicts. One can see why, in some cases, asymmetrical solutions could
make sense as coordination points. It is harder to see how such asymmetries could
be justified as a general solution. Indeed, it is hard to see how it could be
universalized at all.
One solution would be to claim that it is not a particular asymmetry that is
universalized, but rather the principle which allows for differential benefits based
on bargaining power. This solution, however, raises several additional problems.
First, what is bargaining power in this context? Remember the contractors have a
protected baseline of rights and, as far as I can tell from the text, this baseline is
shared between contractors. Leaving aside the theoretical problems with defining
such a baseline that I mentioned above, how can the parties have differential
bargaining power if they all have the same or similar disagreement points? Moehler
argues that the fact that the parties have these shared disagreement points and,
hence, cannot exploit their bargaining power, is the key feature of the stabilized
Nash bargaining solution.
Second, insofar as there are minor differences in bargaining power given the shared
or similar disagreement points, the question arises again as to why one should think
that any inequality in bargaining power in a given case of conflict should generalize
to all cases of conflict. If it doesn’t generalize or there are no decisive reasons for
10

thinking that it would, then by the homo prudens model of practical rationality, we
shouldn’t expect any agreement to be stable. This is the old paradox of diversity
rearing it head again. A diversity of bargaining powers over cases should lead to a
diverse set of results and any agreement that didn’t take that point into account
would be vulnerable to instability. Remember, homo prudens can’t make genuine
commitments. They are trapped in a world of modular reasoning where they should
make a better deal if their bargaining power improves or accept a worse one if it
decreases. This fact is in tension, however with claim that the weak principle of
universalization is both unique and general.
3. Conclusion
I have raised a number of theoretical and practical questions and concerns I have
with Moehler’s project as it is developed in Minimal Morality. To summarize, there
is too much morality and the discussion of application is too minimal. That said,
this is a tremendous book. It covers considerable ground and takes on the hardest
and, to my mind, the most important questions of moral and political thought. If my
concerns make it seem like I think Moehler has been unsuccessful in answering
these questions, this would only put him same company as all who have come
before
him.
But, ultimately, I do not think Moehler has been unsuccessful. He has done several
things here that are important despite any substantive disagreements I may have
with the theory. First, he has highlighted the problem of deep pluralism in the
context of rational choice contractualism more than anyone else. Second, his critical
analysis of Gauthier, Rawls, and Harsanyi in Part I (which I have largely ignored
in these critical comments) are worth the price of admission on their own. Moehler
is one of the very best readers of these three thinkers, especially of Harsanyi with
whom he shares much. Third, and most importantly, Moehler’s innovation of multilevel contractualism is a very important development that, I suspect, will be the
real, enduring legacy of this work.
In the end, Moehler has argued that we can go from Hobbes to Kant back to Hobbes
again and he has helped us to rethink the key moral and political questions along
the way. I think that he is right that there is more in common between what Jean
Hampton (1991) called the “two faces” of contractualism. It is no surprise, I
suppose, that a work dedicated to showing how rational people who disagree deeply
about morality can, nevertheless, find common ground should also show us that
two of the great moral and political thinkers shared more common ground than is
typically assumed.
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